http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kurdish%E2%80%93Turkish_conflict
Useful material
martes, 19 de junio de 2012
terrorism and recent turkish stance
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-282784-turkey-calls-on-international-community-to-unite-against-terrorism.html
Turkey calls on international community to unite against terrorism
(Photo: AA)
7 June 2012 / LAMİYA ADİLGIZI , İSTANBUL
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has called on the international community to come together to fight against terrorism, saying, “We cannot fight against terrorism, unless we join our hands.”
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and other senior international politicians visit Turkey on Thursday to attend the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).
According to the Anatolia news agency, the GCTF meeting brings together foreign ministers and other high-ranking diplomats from the European Union as well as from 29 other countries. The coordination committee is co-chaired by Turkey and the US.
In an opening speech during the Ministerial-Level Plenary of the coordinating committee meeting of the GCTF, Davutoğlu said that while all countries are confronting the threat of terrorism, it is an unspoken reality that sometimes we have varying perceptions of threats and national priorities vis-à-vis terrorist organizations and offenders. He continued by noting that the fight against terrorism does not allow for complacency in regards to any particular terrorist organization, irrespective of national threat perceptions or priorities.
Referring to Turkey's past experience of destructive and malicious terrorist acts, Davutoğlu reminded listeners of Turkey's long-standing struggle against terrorism, which has claimed innocent lives in the country.
The foreign minister stated that Turkey cannot fight against terrorism only through military measures. “While the security component of the fight is critical, it is not alone sufficient to obtain the desired result. It is simply not possible to achieve lasting security at the cost of democratic freedoms. Hence, we have to preserve the critical balance between security requirements on the one hand, and democratic freedoms and basic human rights on the other.”
Davutoğlu also said that any counterterrorism strategy, no matter how successful on its own merits, can lead to tangible results only if it enjoys true international support. “Any loophole in this chain and terrorists will immediately zero in on that soft spot and capitalize on it,” said Davutoğlu, adding that counterterrorism strategies should be comprehensive and involve multiple approaches.
Recalling the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organization's outrageous and indiscriminate attacks targeting the civilian population, Davutoğlu first extended his deepest condolences to bereaved families, expressing Turkey's solidarity with victims, then underlined the fact that Turkey will continue to fight PKK terrorism with full determination and in absolute compliance with the rule of law.
“We expect full support in this fight from the global community, in line with their international obligations. The PKK should not be able to continue its activities abroad, particularly in Europe under seemingly legal structures and façade organizations. Their continuing ability to do so is an affront to us all,” said Davutoğlu, characterizing the GCTF as signaling international determination to work together against violent extremism and terrorism.
Noting recent advances in the international community's fight against terrorism, Clinton said that the US is backing Turkey in all its counterterrorism efforts.
“The United States strongly stands with Turkey in its fight against the PKK and other groups," said Clinton, addressing the conflict in Turkey that has claimed tens of thousands of lives.
About international joint efforts to disrupt terrorist financing and improve international coordination, Clinton said, “Over the past decade 120,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested around the world and more than 35,000 have been convicted. Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda cells have been devastated. Our citizens are safe because of the work we have done together.”
Despite the progresses made on counterterrorism, Clinton admits the danger from terrorism remains “urgent and undeniable.”
The secretary of state mentioned the necessity of having a strategic and comprehensive approach to counterterrorism that integrates both military and civilian power and that uses intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, development and humanitarian resources. “We need to do more than remove terrorists from the battlefields. We need to attack financing, recruitment and safe havens. We need to take on ideology and diminish its appeal particularly to young people,” said Clinton, adding that improving conditions for women is important as their security is “a bellwether for society's security.”
According to the Anatolia news agency, the GCTF meeting brings together foreign ministers and other high-ranking diplomats from the European Union as well as from 29 other countries. The coordination committee is co-chaired by Turkey and the US.
In an opening speech during the Ministerial-Level Plenary of the coordinating committee meeting of the GCTF, Davutoğlu said that while all countries are confronting the threat of terrorism, it is an unspoken reality that sometimes we have varying perceptions of threats and national priorities vis-à-vis terrorist organizations and offenders. He continued by noting that the fight against terrorism does not allow for complacency in regards to any particular terrorist organization, irrespective of national threat perceptions or priorities.
Referring to Turkey's past experience of destructive and malicious terrorist acts, Davutoğlu reminded listeners of Turkey's long-standing struggle against terrorism, which has claimed innocent lives in the country.
The foreign minister stated that Turkey cannot fight against terrorism only through military measures. “While the security component of the fight is critical, it is not alone sufficient to obtain the desired result. It is simply not possible to achieve lasting security at the cost of democratic freedoms. Hence, we have to preserve the critical balance between security requirements on the one hand, and democratic freedoms and basic human rights on the other.”
Davutoğlu also said that any counterterrorism strategy, no matter how successful on its own merits, can lead to tangible results only if it enjoys true international support. “Any loophole in this chain and terrorists will immediately zero in on that soft spot and capitalize on it,” said Davutoğlu, adding that counterterrorism strategies should be comprehensive and involve multiple approaches.
Recalling the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organization's outrageous and indiscriminate attacks targeting the civilian population, Davutoğlu first extended his deepest condolences to bereaved families, expressing Turkey's solidarity with victims, then underlined the fact that Turkey will continue to fight PKK terrorism with full determination and in absolute compliance with the rule of law.
“We expect full support in this fight from the global community, in line with their international obligations. The PKK should not be able to continue its activities abroad, particularly in Europe under seemingly legal structures and façade organizations. Their continuing ability to do so is an affront to us all,” said Davutoğlu, characterizing the GCTF as signaling international determination to work together against violent extremism and terrorism.
Noting recent advances in the international community's fight against terrorism, Clinton said that the US is backing Turkey in all its counterterrorism efforts.
“The United States strongly stands with Turkey in its fight against the PKK and other groups," said Clinton, addressing the conflict in Turkey that has claimed tens of thousands of lives.
About international joint efforts to disrupt terrorist financing and improve international coordination, Clinton said, “Over the past decade 120,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested around the world and more than 35,000 have been convicted. Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda cells have been devastated. Our citizens are safe because of the work we have done together.”
Despite the progresses made on counterterrorism, Clinton admits the danger from terrorism remains “urgent and undeniable.”
The secretary of state mentioned the necessity of having a strategic and comprehensive approach to counterterrorism that integrates both military and civilian power and that uses intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, development and humanitarian resources. “We need to do more than remove terrorists from the battlefields. We need to attack financing, recruitment and safe havens. We need to take on ideology and diminish its appeal particularly to young people,” said Clinton, adding that improving conditions for women is important as their security is “a bellwether for society's security.”
link to blog
http://www.journalistinturkey.com/blogs/baby-soldiers-human-beings_2447/
blog link of a journalist in turkey
blog link of a journalist in turkey
Child soldiers
NİHAT ALİ ÖZCAN
NİHAT ALİ ÖZCAN > The PKK and the ‘Child Soldiers’
Turkey has been struggling with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for a long time. The question has, of course, political, legal, economic, social and psychological aspects. Among the most important aspects of the issue, which has been ignored up to now, is the “child soldiers” who have been abused for various purposes.
A survey which I conducted with a friend of mine on the data regarding the age, gender, region, survival time and so on of the PKK recruits has pointed out how serious a problem we are facing. The survey is based mainly on the data of 1,362 militants among the PKK’s mountain cadres who lost their lives for various reasons between 2001 and September 2011.
According to this, 12 percent of armed militants were females while 88 percent were males. Some 73.3 percent of militants were Turkish, 12.4 percent were Syrian, 10 percent were Iranian and 3.7 percent were Iraqi. In light of this data, the PKK is apparently a trans-border and highly complicated question.
The most striking piece of information is the recruitment age of the militants. Some 42 percent of the PKK militants were 18 and below. Also, 9.25 percent of mountain cadres consisted of minors under 15. The situation was graver regarding females. The recruiting age for girls declines further, and the average sinks to 17.7.
Of course there are many reasons behind those have been recruited. Those reasons are not fixed and may change in time. For example, children “volunteer” nowadays mostly because of economic, social, cultural, anthropological, psychological and other reasons, whereas they were abducted and forcibly recruited in the beginning.
The survey shows that the PKK, just like similar organizations, is recruiting a number of children and exploiting them atrociously for its military purposes. Thus, a short while after that survey appeared in the media, Murat Karayılan, the PKK’s military chief, confirmed the data in a sense by making a statement in northern Iraq to a news agency close to them.
“Still, there are international institutions which follow those issues and are working in parallel with the United Nations,” he said. “Let me put it right now that the [PKK’s fighting forces] signed a protocol a month ago with an international agencies regarding the age of the fighters they would take into the war. Perhaps the Turkish state is informed about that; nowadays, both the prime minister and Nihat Ali Özcan are especially emphasizing the age issue. It’s true; there are recruits at younger ages. But not kids at 9 years old. What we call tender ages are youngsters who are 16 to 17 years old. But we do not put the youth at that age into war. At the beginning, we could not find a chance to send them back since they had already come. So we try to prepare them for the future by training them … in our environment and giving them an ideological, political and cultural education. There is such a reality but there are not kids that are 9, 10 and 14 years old as they stated – that is not true.”
Putting children into conflicts directly or indirectly is not an acceptable situation for anybody. Everybody is responsible for their future and for protecting their rights morally and consciously. Everyone has the duty and responsibility to terminate this.
A survey which I conducted with a friend of mine on the data regarding the age, gender, region, survival time and so on of the PKK recruits has pointed out how serious a problem we are facing. The survey is based mainly on the data of 1,362 militants among the PKK’s mountain cadres who lost their lives for various reasons between 2001 and September 2011.
According to this, 12 percent of armed militants were females while 88 percent were males. Some 73.3 percent of militants were Turkish, 12.4 percent were Syrian, 10 percent were Iranian and 3.7 percent were Iraqi. In light of this data, the PKK is apparently a trans-border and highly complicated question.
The most striking piece of information is the recruitment age of the militants. Some 42 percent of the PKK militants were 18 and below. Also, 9.25 percent of mountain cadres consisted of minors under 15. The situation was graver regarding females. The recruiting age for girls declines further, and the average sinks to 17.7.
Of course there are many reasons behind those have been recruited. Those reasons are not fixed and may change in time. For example, children “volunteer” nowadays mostly because of economic, social, cultural, anthropological, psychological and other reasons, whereas they were abducted and forcibly recruited in the beginning.
The survey shows that the PKK, just like similar organizations, is recruiting a number of children and exploiting them atrociously for its military purposes. Thus, a short while after that survey appeared in the media, Murat Karayılan, the PKK’s military chief, confirmed the data in a sense by making a statement in northern Iraq to a news agency close to them.
“Still, there are international institutions which follow those issues and are working in parallel with the United Nations,” he said. “Let me put it right now that the [PKK’s fighting forces] signed a protocol a month ago with an international agencies regarding the age of the fighters they would take into the war. Perhaps the Turkish state is informed about that; nowadays, both the prime minister and Nihat Ali Özcan are especially emphasizing the age issue. It’s true; there are recruits at younger ages. But not kids at 9 years old. What we call tender ages are youngsters who are 16 to 17 years old. But we do not put the youth at that age into war. At the beginning, we could not find a chance to send them back since they had already come. So we try to prepare them for the future by training them … in our environment and giving them an ideological, political and cultural education. There is such a reality but there are not kids that are 9, 10 and 14 years old as they stated – that is not true.”
Putting children into conflicts directly or indirectly is not an acceptable situation for anybody. Everybody is responsible for their future and for protecting their rights morally and consciously. Everyone has the duty and responsibility to terminate this.
February/23/2012
The Erdoğan effect: Turkey, Egypt and the future of the Middle East
Nuh Yılmaz
The Erdoğan effect: Turkey, Egypt and the future of the Middle East
By Nuh Yilmaz, Kadir Ustun
Turkey's foreign policy activism is drawing considerable attention these days, particularly because of the momentous transformation in the broader Middle East. The tour of Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdoğan to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in September underscored the rise of Turkey's involvement in the region—and of Ankara's potential to be a formidable and positive influence.
Erdoğan articulated Turkey's vision for a democratic Middle East. "The freedom message spreading from Tahrir Square has become a light of hope for all the oppressed through Tripoli, Damascus, and Sanaa," he told an audience at the Cairo Opera House. "Governments have to get their legitimacy from the people's will. This is the core of Turkey's politics in the region." Equally, Erdoğan's tour demonstrated Turkey's recognition of the regional shifts. He signaled that Israel will no longer be shielded from accountability by a strategic status quo that buffeted authoritarian Arab rulers like former President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Erdoğan's message to Israel emphasized human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as the true parameters of regional balance of power. "Israel must respect human rights and act as a normal country and then it will be liberated from its isolation," Erdoğan said.
Turkish democracy has matured and Ankara feels confident enough to present itself as an inspiration to the Middle East. Turkey's transformation from a staunchly secularist NATO ally under military tutelage to a democratic model did not occur overnight. Turkey, in fact, considered the Middle East as an unfamiliar and hostile region for much of its republican history. During the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, Turkey maintained a largely hostile and confrontational posture in its relations with many countries there. Turkey's conflict involving the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) overrode all other issues, and the Turkish state was suspicious of virtually all of its neighbors for supporting the PKK. Claiming to represent legitimate demands of the Kurdish people in Turkey, the PKK had launched an armed struggle against Turkish security forces in the 1980s. Regimes in Syria and Iraq allowed the PKK to base militants in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (then under Syria's control) and in northern Iraq.
A sea change came, however, with the Turkish Parliament's "No" to allowing United States troops to stage an invasion of Iraq from Turkish military bases in 2003. Since then, Turkey adopted the so-called 'zero problems with neighbors' policy. This prioritized stability and peace in the region and had a proactive outlook as it sought to prevent conflicts as much as manage them in coordination with neighbors. Turkish officials became more confident after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 and a general reduction of violence in the conflict with Kurdish militants. Therefore, Turkey would no longer define its foreign policy solely by terrorism concerns.
As it improved its relations with all of its neighbors, Turkey advocated political integration as well as free flow of goods and services in its neighborhood. This policy achieved concrete results in the form of increased and diversified economic relations, heightened diplomatic clout and political influence, closer coordination with neighbors on issues such as terrorism, mediation in international conflicts, and a broadly positive response to Turkish foreign policy. In implementing its neighborhood policy, Turkey advocated speaking to all sides, including groups such as the Islamist Palestinian movement Hamas. Seen as an honest broker, Turkey mediated between Israel and Syria, as well as between Iran and the international community in the nuclear issue. Turkey's diplomatic initiatives were never guaranteed success; but the new Turkish foreign policy was no longer a spectator to regional developments but a serious actor shaping and contributing to various difficult issues.
Some have argued that the Arab revolutions undermined Turkey's neighborhood policy, which to some extent was based on good relations with the region's authoritarian regimes. It has been charged that Turkey was not committed to democracy and simply pursued its interests. However, notwithstanding the fact that all countries were caught off guard by the Arab Spring, Turkey advocated a peaceful, and democratic, outcome. Ankara declined to support Mubarak, or President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria, or any of the authoritarian leaders; on the contrary, it called on them to either step down or undertake serious reforms immediately. Turkey avoided a totalistic approach as it distinguished between the different dynamics at work in each of the countries undergoing political upheaval.
The political transformation in the Middle East is part of the broader global transformation toward a multipolar world. Turkey has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy precisely because it sees the global order being reconfigured in the aftermath of the Cold War. More specifically for the Middle East, however, the Arab regimes' claims to legitimacy in the name of protecting their people against "colonialist and imperialist" powers proved to be hollow. The new order in the region will require governments that enable the people to chart their own destinies. It will have to be based on participatory politics, democratic principles, and peace and stability. Turkey and Egypt are poised to become major actors in this new order. They will be competitors as well as collaborators, given their competing and complementary features and capabilities.
Neo-Ottomanism Versus the New Turkey
Turkey's special and complex relationship with the Middle East and North Africa is often underappreciated. Those who recognize it tend to avoid discussing it out of fear of raising the issue of "neo-Ottomanism." Although historiography in places like the Balkans and the Middle East have produced nationalist narratives under the broad theme of the 'Turkish yoke,' Turkey's ties with the Middle East cannot be reduced to Ottoman political rule over these lands. Ottomans and modern Turkey have shared institutional and legal commonalities as well as cultural affinities with the Middle East.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, Turkey chose not to build on this past and pursued a relatively defensive foreign policy. Tying itself in with the Western security architecture, especially after World War II, Turkey aligned its foreign policy very closely with that of its Western allies. Turkish foreign policy was based on its commitment to countering the 'Communist threat' during the Cold War. Turkey relied on its strategic importance for international legitimacy and relevance. However, Turkey sacrificed democratization for the sake of security concerns in this period; the country's military tutelage regime helped ensure that Turkey retained its Western alliance at the expense of democracy at home.
The Turkish military was supported by the Western alliance even when it intervened in politics through coups d'état, which greatly hampered Turkish democracy. As a mere strategic asset to the Western alliance rather than an actor, Turkey did not try to devise its own foreign policy. Instead, it relied on the Western consensus and kept itself outside regional developments as an active player until the 2000s. The end of the Cold War made it clear that the country's strategic relevance could take it only so far, and it had to respond seriously to demands for freedoms, and advance democracy along with economic development at home. The military tutelage could no longer justify rule by pointing to the conflict with the PKK or 'foreign enemies providing safe havens for terrorists.' Turkey witnessed the rise of the middle class demanding more of a say in domestic and foreign policy issues, which had been monopolized by the military and civilian bureaucracies. This change resulted in a strong popular push for more democracy at home and a more 'dignified' foreign policy.
Turkey's adoption of a more proactive foreign policy was thus related to the democratic transformation within the country. Turkey proceeded to fill the vacuum in the Middle East created by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Ankara's 'peace and stability' vision for the region was reflected in its efforts to broker a deal between Syria and Israel, its mediation efforts between various factions in Lebanon, its changed attitude toward Kurds in northern Iraq, and its involvement in negotiations to resolve the international dispute over Iran's nuclear program. Turkey made the determination that it was in its security and economic interest to advocate greater economic and political integration and oppose sanctions as well as conflicts in the Middle East.
Turkey's economic relations with the region have improved as a result of both the shifts in global economic trends and Turkey's new neighborhood policy. Yet, while better relations brought economic benefits, Turkey recognized that the political structures in place made good trade relations and regional integration difficult. In addition, ongoing conflicts in the region were an obstacle to any major improvement in the region's economic outlook.
It can be argued that Turkey's foreign policy activism in the Middle East contributed to the downfall of authoritarian regimes, by implicitly calling for the end of the 'Camp David order' and exposing repressive regimes that survived with the help of regional strategic arrangements related to the conflict with Israel. Turkey showed that it is possible to be democratic, have good relations with the West, and still stand up to unjust Israeli policies. Its 'dignified' stance was strengthened after the incident at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in 2009 in which Erdoğan stormed out of a discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres about Israel's war against Hamas. Erdoğan's gesture, widely acclaimed on the Arab street, exposed and undermined Arab leaders who had acquiesced to Israeli policies and committed to the status quo.
If Turkey found itself increasingly unable to talk to the Arab regimes, it was able to speak to ordinary Arabs. This was not mere populism, as some critics have charged, but a sincere response to the yearning for dignity. As demonstrated by the enthusiastic welcome that Erdoğan received in Egypt in September, Turkey's stance has had a significant political impact across the Arab world. In the short and medium terms, Turkey's challenge will be to turn this positive outlook into concrete policies in bilateral relations in order to sustain a long-term collaboration toward a more democratic political order in the region.
The 'Camp David Order'
If one can speak about the 'old Turkey,' there is also an 'old Egypt.' The Mubarak government enjoyed a privileged position in the region as a facilitator of the 'Camp David order.' It aligned itself with Israel albeit in a 'cold peace' relationship, and, in return, received close to $2 billion annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Egypt supported the Arab world's normalization with Israel through the 'peace process' and reduced its regional ambition to supporting U.S. interests.
Ultimately, however, Egypt had to punch below its weight in foreign policy. Its investment in the regional order for the sake of security, combined with its unresponsiveness to the demands of Egyptians for greater political freedom and economic opportunity, resulted in a loss of credibility and prestige for Mubarak's regime domestically, regionally, and internationally. It tried to survive its legitimacy crisis through a moderate authoritarianism, and by oppressing Islamist movements and other opposition groups. But the January 25 revolution made it clear that this strategic arrangement was not sustainable.
A significant aspect of Mubarak's problem was that Egypt's regional role became over-leveraged in the Palestinian issue. On one hand, Egypt defended Palestinian rights, and coordinated peace efforts with Israel especially after the Madrid Conference in 1991. However, following the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, Egypt failed to side with Palestinians as a whole, and instead sided with Fatah leaders Yasser Arafat and, later, Mahmoud Abbas, at the expense of Fatah's Islamist opposition. Mubarak defined Egypt's regional role as maintaining the 'Camp David order': legitimizing Israel's security needs, and supporting solutions accepted by Fatah without offending Israel.
Mubarak's partisan approach turned out to have negative consequences for Egypt and his regime. His collaboration in the isolation of Gaza, after Hamas won the elections in January 2006, had a negative effect on Egypt's image in the eyes of the Palestinians in general. Egypt thus found itself at odds with both the Hamas administration in Gaza and with Turkey on issues including the closure of the Egyptian–Gazan border. Undermined by Turkey's support for the Palestinians and Erdoğan criticism of Israel's 'Operation Cast Lead' against Gaza in 2008, Egypt faced a deepening legitimacy crisis with respect to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The 'old Egypt' also enjoyed strategic importance arising from the Suez Canal and its geographical location between the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. The passage from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean is critical for the navigation of warships as well as transit of oil and gas tankers. The canal provided the Atlantic alliance access to the Gulf and secured energy routes for Europe. Egypt indirectly contributed to the stability of global energy prices at the expense of Russian monopoly of energy resources by ensuring the diversity of energy supply routes. Egypt has also long influenced African politics and Nile Basin geopolitics and assumed a key role in inner parts of Africa.
In ideological terms, Mubarak's Egypt also attempted to be a bulwark against political Islam. Through Al-Azhar, one of the oldest centers of Islamic teaching, it sought to have a moderate influence on religious thinking throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, Mubarak sought to contain Islamist political movements through repression. In the 'war on terrorism' after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Egypt played an instrumental part in intelligence operations, especially considering that many Egyptian citizens held important positions in Al-Qaeda. In his regime's struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood (a leading Egyptian opposition group) Mubarak benefited from the global paranoia about Islamic extremism.
The 'New Egypt'
There are three scenarios for the political evolution of the 'new Egypt.' The least probable one is the occurrence of a military coup with a minor modification of the old order under Mubarak. It is important to bear in mind that as long as the military is involved in politics, there will always be a case for such a scenario. Nevertheless, domestic, regional, and global conditions, and the persistence of Egypt's January 25 protest movement, make a complete military takeover in Egypt something that would be very difficult to achieve. From its perspective, the Egyptian military would be understandably reluctant to assume responsibility for the country's ongoing economic failures.
The most likely scenario, at least for an extended transitional period, may be the establishment of a regime of military tutelage. Officers will hold political and military powers overseeing a civil technocratic government. Veto mechanisms would be established, where the civilian initiative is kept in check by institutions controlled by the military. This, of course, would restrict freedoms in daily life and generally hamper civilian authority. Such an arrangement kept Turkey anchored in the Atlantic alliance during the Cold War era but it proved unresponsive to the social, economic, and political realities of the 'new Turkey.' In the case of Egypt, military tutelage would effectively mean continuation of the 'Camp David order' domestically. Though a very possible scenario, the Egyptian military would have to convince Islamists and liberals that it was in the interests of the country.
The most desirable yet most difficult scenario is the creation of a democracy. Egypt would delegate authority to civilian actors and create a democratic constitution. Old elites would be withdrawn from politics. Even assuming success, it will take at least a few years before democracy takes hold and Egypt can reassert itself as a major regional player.
A democratic or semidemocratic Egypt may herald important shifts. Egypt will likely adopt a tougher posture toward Israel due to popular pressure that came to a head in September. Israeli forces in pursuit of terrorists entered the Sinai and killed Egyptian security personnel, prompting the interim Egyptian government to withdraw Egypt's ambassador from Israel. Later, protesters stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo, effectively forcing Israeli diplomats to flee the country. The incidents led Egyptians to criticize the peace treaty with Israel, which Prime Minister Essam Sharaf publicly described as "not sacred" and open to modification. A democratic Egypt that includes Muslim Brotherhood participation in the parliament and government may pursue the normalization of relations with Hamas and put an end to the isolation of Gaza.
In that vein, Egypt can play a positive role in integrating Islamist movements into the political structures in the region. Participation of Islamist parties in Egypt's democracy can provide a model of greater diversity within Islamist movements, whose previous exclusion from official politics encouraged reactionary and sometimes extreme behavior on the part of a minority of Islamists. If Islamism is normalized, nascent Islamist administrations in the region will not feel marginalized and can pursue politics democratically. That may encourage the emergence of more independent, democratic Arab countries.
A democratic Egypt may also influence the evolution of a new Arab nationalism—one that is more moderate and substantive than the more reactionary variety rooted in the pan-Arabism of the 1960s. Arab nationalism can become a more authentic expression once it is stripped of its authoritarian character. The involvement of Islamists will help ensure that any nationalistic revival does not turn into anti-Iranianism or anti-Turkism.
Iran's influence in the region will be affected by a new balance of power. Iran has posed a challenge to the status quo by championing the cause of the Palestinians. But being a Shiite-dominated country lacking Turkey's democratic credentials has limited its leverage. The emergence of a more democratic region with a Sunni majority will require Iran to revise its regional policies. In contrast with Turkey's nonsectarian approach, Iran may move toward exploiting sectarian differences. Egypt, hopefully, will resist attempts to forge sectarian alliances such as those supported by the Gulf countries. If the Muslim Brotherhood participates in government and controls its Salafist wing, the anti-Iranian bloc in the Arab world will likely lose strength. Such a change will leave Saudi Arabia more isolated. The so-called 'Sunni crescent plan,' supported by Gulf countries and the U.S., which aims to contain Iran through the forging of a sectarian bloc, may be rendered meaningless. In that case, struggles in the region would reflect competing national interests rather than potentially destructive sectarian bigotry.
Forging a Democratic Middle East
During his visit to Cairo in September, Egyptians gave the Turkish prime minister a hero's welcome. Indeed, some held up signs reading: "If Erdoğan had been our leader, we would have liberated our Jerusalem." While Erdoğan's Arab tour promoted Turkey's aspiration to contribute to the democratic transformation in the Middle East, it also reflected Ankara's vision of an integrated region opposed to national, religious, and sectarian divisions.
In Egypt, democracy is by far the most desirable scenario for Turkey. Indeed, Ankara must assume an active role and share its experience in evolving from the tutelary regime to a democratic one. Turkey can help Egypt, given its extensive experience in transition to civilian rule, managing civil–military relations and its long history with a multiparty political system, conducting free and fair elections, and constitution-making.
Concerning strategic interests, Turkey would like to see an Egypt that pays serious attention to people's demands, promotes the rule of law, recognizes the representation of all political actors, and solves its regional legitimacy problem. An economically powerful and democratic partner in the Middle East would fit Turkey's foreign policy priorities, which promote regional economic and political integration as well as freedom of movement. Turkey's own domestic political transformation led to the expansion of its presence in the region. A similar outcome for Egypt would be the most desirable for Turkey, despite the unavoidable areas of possible competition.
Turkey's regional standing will be directly affected by the developments in Egypt. An authoritarian Egypt will continue to be a source of harm for the region: normalization of Islamist movements would be delayed; the deadlock in the Palestinian issue would continue; and sectarian conflicts may emerge and threaten the regional peace and stability. However, if Egypt moves toward becoming a true democracy, it will undergo radical changes for the better in its domestic political life and foreign policy.
A democratic Egypt will limit Turkey's influence and popularity on the Arab street, but the two countries would have opportunities and shared responsibilities. They are the region's two largest key Sunni powers, comparable in size, historical experience, and strategic importance. They will have to lead the wider region toward freer and more democratic structures. And they will also have to shoulder the burden of managing the conflicts. A promising sign of potential cooperation was their work together in the Palestinian reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas in May. Relations between Turkey and Mubarak's regime had been strained after the Hamas leader's visit to Turkey amid Egypt's general discomfort with Turkey's proactive foreign policy in the Middle East.
The outcome of the current upheavals will help determine the future of Turkey–Egypt relations. As both Turkey and Egypt seek to resolve the crisis in their differing capacities, their cooperation and competition will be determined, to a large extent, by how Egypt emerges out of its own domestic political turmoil. Turkey's foreign policy activism, which has already deeply affected the region, and Egypt's new foreign policy orientation, influenced by and responsive to the demands of its domestic public opinion, will together play a crucial role in shaping the new regional political order.
If Egypt moves toward a truly civilian democracy, Turkey's gains in the region will become permanent and its role will increase. If Egypt comes out of the current turmoil as an economically and politically strong actor, competition will likely occur but this will empower both countries. If Egypt goes toward a tutelage system, Turkey as the only consolidated democracy would gain ground at Egypt's expense. The military in Egypt would be preoccupied trying to balance Islamist and liberal forces, which would diminish Egypt's potential to be a leader in the region.
A relatively weak Egypt would make Turkey's job more difficult, even if Ankara's prestige would remain high. Turkey may not find a partner to share its role in terms of regional policies and region-based approaches. The Middle East would waste time with short-term crisis management instead of constructing a truly new regional order. The urgent need for developing human resources, capacity building, and creating sustainable development projects would be delayed. Turkey constitutes an example of civilian power pushing back the influence of the military to consolidate its democratic institutions. As such, Ankara must oppose arguments that it is too early to establish full democracy in Egypt. Turkey's democratization was hampered by such arguments, which delayed civilianization of Turkish democracy.
When it comes to construction of a new regional order, as an economic and democratic power, Turkey has a lot to offer. Turkey is in many ways ahead of Egypt in what it can contribute to the shaping of the new Middle East. Turkey's challenge, however, is to institutionalize its regional gains and invest in sustaining its commitment to the region. The worst thing for Turkey would be to appear as a force that cannot deliver. Given the high expectations from Turkey among the Arab public and the intellectuals, Turkey will be held to a bigger test. In contrast, expectations from Egypt will be quite modest, and any step Egypt takes in the right direction will be considered positive.
This is where cooperation can come: Turkey and Egypt have the ability to fill the gaps left by one another. Egypt may not be able to confront Israeli policies directly, but Turkey can do that. Egypt also cannot promote democratic transitions around the Middle East as effectively as Turkey can. Turkey's intense pressure on the Al-Assad regime in Damascus, in the form of harboring opposition groups and military defectors, conducting border exercises, and threatening sanctions, is a clear example of this. Both Egypt and Turkey will be at odds with the Gulf powers who are neither en route to a democratic transition nor eager to take risks in the Palestinian issue. Those countries may become increasingly alienated from the region if Turkey–Egypt cooperation increases. This will be exacerbated if the U.S. (as the closest ally of the Gulf powers) becomes less inclined to support the authoritarian Gulf regimes.
Egypt has an advantage over Turkey in the regional leadership position as an Arab nation. But given the high diversity in the Middle East in terms of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity, Turkey has an advantage as it can speak to a variety of actors from different ethnicities (Iraqi Kurds) and sectarian groups (Iraqi Shiites, Lebanese Christians). Egypt's importance will be most apparent in the Arab–Israeli 'peace process,' which Turkey considers the single most important regional issue in the Middle East.
Because of its increasingly independent stance on foreign policy issues, Turkey has gained the trust of Arab populations and showed that Arab regimes were not only dysfunctional but also inept in constructing true solutions to regional problems. Turkey will need to build on this reputation while Egypt will have to earn it. Egypt may feel forced to distance itself from the U.S. policies in order to do that, while Turkey does not have to prove its independent approach by distancing itself from the West. Egypt must be careful not to fall into determining its policies based on anti-Islamist, anti-Shiite, anti-West, or anti-Israel frameworks. A proactive as opposed to reactionary Egypt, and a more democratic, independent Egypt, will prove to be a robust force.
The Arab revolutions have presented the Middle East with a historic opportunity for a more democratic and dignified future. Egypt's evolution into a stable democracy will be crucial for the structural transformation of the region. If the new Egypt seizes this opportunity without reverting to a pseudo-democracy for piecemeal strategic arrangements as it did in the past, the prospect of the emergence of a new Middle East may turn into reality. The greatest challenge for Turkey during this period is to help create the new language and terms of discourse. Turkey must not watch but manage this process, as it did during the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. If Turkey can remain involved and relevant in the medium term, then it may help the Arab momentum to create a truly new regional order.
Kadir Ustun is the research director of the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in Washington. He is the assistant editor of SETA's quarterly journal, Insight Turkey, and a contributor to the Al Jazeera English channel and insideIRAN.org.
Nuh Yilmaz is head of quality assurance for Al Jazeera Türk. He is the former Washington bureau chief for Turkish media organizations, including CNN Türk, ATV, 24, and STAR. He is a contributor to publications including the Washington Times, the National, Foreign Policy, and Open Democracy. He is a member of the board of the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research in Washington, and served as SETA's founding director from 2008 to 2011.
www.aucegypt.edu
Turkey's foreign policy activism is drawing considerable attention these days, particularly because of the momentous transformation in the broader Middle East. The tour of Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdoğan to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in September underscored the rise of Turkey's involvement in the region—and of Ankara's potential to be a formidable and positive influence.
Erdoğan articulated Turkey's vision for a democratic Middle East. "The freedom message spreading from Tahrir Square has become a light of hope for all the oppressed through Tripoli, Damascus, and Sanaa," he told an audience at the Cairo Opera House. "Governments have to get their legitimacy from the people's will. This is the core of Turkey's politics in the region." Equally, Erdoğan's tour demonstrated Turkey's recognition of the regional shifts. He signaled that Israel will no longer be shielded from accountability by a strategic status quo that buffeted authoritarian Arab rulers like former President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Erdoğan's message to Israel emphasized human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as the true parameters of regional balance of power. "Israel must respect human rights and act as a normal country and then it will be liberated from its isolation," Erdoğan said.
Turkish democracy has matured and Ankara feels confident enough to present itself as an inspiration to the Middle East. Turkey's transformation from a staunchly secularist NATO ally under military tutelage to a democratic model did not occur overnight. Turkey, in fact, considered the Middle East as an unfamiliar and hostile region for much of its republican history. During the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, Turkey maintained a largely hostile and confrontational posture in its relations with many countries there. Turkey's conflict involving the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) overrode all other issues, and the Turkish state was suspicious of virtually all of its neighbors for supporting the PKK. Claiming to represent legitimate demands of the Kurdish people in Turkey, the PKK had launched an armed struggle against Turkish security forces in the 1980s. Regimes in Syria and Iraq allowed the PKK to base militants in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (then under Syria's control) and in northern Iraq.
A sea change came, however, with the Turkish Parliament's "No" to allowing United States troops to stage an invasion of Iraq from Turkish military bases in 2003. Since then, Turkey adopted the so-called 'zero problems with neighbors' policy. This prioritized stability and peace in the region and had a proactive outlook as it sought to prevent conflicts as much as manage them in coordination with neighbors. Turkish officials became more confident after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 and a general reduction of violence in the conflict with Kurdish militants. Therefore, Turkey would no longer define its foreign policy solely by terrorism concerns.
As it improved its relations with all of its neighbors, Turkey advocated political integration as well as free flow of goods and services in its neighborhood. This policy achieved concrete results in the form of increased and diversified economic relations, heightened diplomatic clout and political influence, closer coordination with neighbors on issues such as terrorism, mediation in international conflicts, and a broadly positive response to Turkish foreign policy. In implementing its neighborhood policy, Turkey advocated speaking to all sides, including groups such as the Islamist Palestinian movement Hamas. Seen as an honest broker, Turkey mediated between Israel and Syria, as well as between Iran and the international community in the nuclear issue. Turkey's diplomatic initiatives were never guaranteed success; but the new Turkish foreign policy was no longer a spectator to regional developments but a serious actor shaping and contributing to various difficult issues.
Some have argued that the Arab revolutions undermined Turkey's neighborhood policy, which to some extent was based on good relations with the region's authoritarian regimes. It has been charged that Turkey was not committed to democracy and simply pursued its interests. However, notwithstanding the fact that all countries were caught off guard by the Arab Spring, Turkey advocated a peaceful, and democratic, outcome. Ankara declined to support Mubarak, or President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria, or any of the authoritarian leaders; on the contrary, it called on them to either step down or undertake serious reforms immediately. Turkey avoided a totalistic approach as it distinguished between the different dynamics at work in each of the countries undergoing political upheaval.
The political transformation in the Middle East is part of the broader global transformation toward a multipolar world. Turkey has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy precisely because it sees the global order being reconfigured in the aftermath of the Cold War. More specifically for the Middle East, however, the Arab regimes' claims to legitimacy in the name of protecting their people against "colonialist and imperialist" powers proved to be hollow. The new order in the region will require governments that enable the people to chart their own destinies. It will have to be based on participatory politics, democratic principles, and peace and stability. Turkey and Egypt are poised to become major actors in this new order. They will be competitors as well as collaborators, given their competing and complementary features and capabilities.
Neo-Ottomanism Versus the New Turkey
Turkey's special and complex relationship with the Middle East and North Africa is often underappreciated. Those who recognize it tend to avoid discussing it out of fear of raising the issue of "neo-Ottomanism." Although historiography in places like the Balkans and the Middle East have produced nationalist narratives under the broad theme of the 'Turkish yoke,' Turkey's ties with the Middle East cannot be reduced to Ottoman political rule over these lands. Ottomans and modern Turkey have shared institutional and legal commonalities as well as cultural affinities with the Middle East.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, Turkey chose not to build on this past and pursued a relatively defensive foreign policy. Tying itself in with the Western security architecture, especially after World War II, Turkey aligned its foreign policy very closely with that of its Western allies. Turkish foreign policy was based on its commitment to countering the 'Communist threat' during the Cold War. Turkey relied on its strategic importance for international legitimacy and relevance. However, Turkey sacrificed democratization for the sake of security concerns in this period; the country's military tutelage regime helped ensure that Turkey retained its Western alliance at the expense of democracy at home.
The Turkish military was supported by the Western alliance even when it intervened in politics through coups d'état, which greatly hampered Turkish democracy. As a mere strategic asset to the Western alliance rather than an actor, Turkey did not try to devise its own foreign policy. Instead, it relied on the Western consensus and kept itself outside regional developments as an active player until the 2000s. The end of the Cold War made it clear that the country's strategic relevance could take it only so far, and it had to respond seriously to demands for freedoms, and advance democracy along with economic development at home. The military tutelage could no longer justify rule by pointing to the conflict with the PKK or 'foreign enemies providing safe havens for terrorists.' Turkey witnessed the rise of the middle class demanding more of a say in domestic and foreign policy issues, which had been monopolized by the military and civilian bureaucracies. This change resulted in a strong popular push for more democracy at home and a more 'dignified' foreign policy.
Turkey's adoption of a more proactive foreign policy was thus related to the democratic transformation within the country. Turkey proceeded to fill the vacuum in the Middle East created by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Ankara's 'peace and stability' vision for the region was reflected in its efforts to broker a deal between Syria and Israel, its mediation efforts between various factions in Lebanon, its changed attitude toward Kurds in northern Iraq, and its involvement in negotiations to resolve the international dispute over Iran's nuclear program. Turkey made the determination that it was in its security and economic interest to advocate greater economic and political integration and oppose sanctions as well as conflicts in the Middle East.
Turkey's economic relations with the region have improved as a result of both the shifts in global economic trends and Turkey's new neighborhood policy. Yet, while better relations brought economic benefits, Turkey recognized that the political structures in place made good trade relations and regional integration difficult. In addition, ongoing conflicts in the region were an obstacle to any major improvement in the region's economic outlook.
It can be argued that Turkey's foreign policy activism in the Middle East contributed to the downfall of authoritarian regimes, by implicitly calling for the end of the 'Camp David order' and exposing repressive regimes that survived with the help of regional strategic arrangements related to the conflict with Israel. Turkey showed that it is possible to be democratic, have good relations with the West, and still stand up to unjust Israeli policies. Its 'dignified' stance was strengthened after the incident at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in 2009 in which Erdoğan stormed out of a discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres about Israel's war against Hamas. Erdoğan's gesture, widely acclaimed on the Arab street, exposed and undermined Arab leaders who had acquiesced to Israeli policies and committed to the status quo.
If Turkey found itself increasingly unable to talk to the Arab regimes, it was able to speak to ordinary Arabs. This was not mere populism, as some critics have charged, but a sincere response to the yearning for dignity. As demonstrated by the enthusiastic welcome that Erdoğan received in Egypt in September, Turkey's stance has had a significant political impact across the Arab world. In the short and medium terms, Turkey's challenge will be to turn this positive outlook into concrete policies in bilateral relations in order to sustain a long-term collaboration toward a more democratic political order in the region.
The 'Camp David Order'
If one can speak about the 'old Turkey,' there is also an 'old Egypt.' The Mubarak government enjoyed a privileged position in the region as a facilitator of the 'Camp David order.' It aligned itself with Israel albeit in a 'cold peace' relationship, and, in return, received close to $2 billion annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Egypt supported the Arab world's normalization with Israel through the 'peace process' and reduced its regional ambition to supporting U.S. interests.
Ultimately, however, Egypt had to punch below its weight in foreign policy. Its investment in the regional order for the sake of security, combined with its unresponsiveness to the demands of Egyptians for greater political freedom and economic opportunity, resulted in a loss of credibility and prestige for Mubarak's regime domestically, regionally, and internationally. It tried to survive its legitimacy crisis through a moderate authoritarianism, and by oppressing Islamist movements and other opposition groups. But the January 25 revolution made it clear that this strategic arrangement was not sustainable.
A significant aspect of Mubarak's problem was that Egypt's regional role became over-leveraged in the Palestinian issue. On one hand, Egypt defended Palestinian rights, and coordinated peace efforts with Israel especially after the Madrid Conference in 1991. However, following the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, Egypt failed to side with Palestinians as a whole, and instead sided with Fatah leaders Yasser Arafat and, later, Mahmoud Abbas, at the expense of Fatah's Islamist opposition. Mubarak defined Egypt's regional role as maintaining the 'Camp David order': legitimizing Israel's security needs, and supporting solutions accepted by Fatah without offending Israel.
Mubarak's partisan approach turned out to have negative consequences for Egypt and his regime. His collaboration in the isolation of Gaza, after Hamas won the elections in January 2006, had a negative effect on Egypt's image in the eyes of the Palestinians in general. Egypt thus found itself at odds with both the Hamas administration in Gaza and with Turkey on issues including the closure of the Egyptian–Gazan border. Undermined by Turkey's support for the Palestinians and Erdoğan criticism of Israel's 'Operation Cast Lead' against Gaza in 2008, Egypt faced a deepening legitimacy crisis with respect to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The 'old Egypt' also enjoyed strategic importance arising from the Suez Canal and its geographical location between the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. The passage from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean is critical for the navigation of warships as well as transit of oil and gas tankers. The canal provided the Atlantic alliance access to the Gulf and secured energy routes for Europe. Egypt indirectly contributed to the stability of global energy prices at the expense of Russian monopoly of energy resources by ensuring the diversity of energy supply routes. Egypt has also long influenced African politics and Nile Basin geopolitics and assumed a key role in inner parts of Africa.
In ideological terms, Mubarak's Egypt also attempted to be a bulwark against political Islam. Through Al-Azhar, one of the oldest centers of Islamic teaching, it sought to have a moderate influence on religious thinking throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, Mubarak sought to contain Islamist political movements through repression. In the 'war on terrorism' after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Egypt played an instrumental part in intelligence operations, especially considering that many Egyptian citizens held important positions in Al-Qaeda. In his regime's struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood (a leading Egyptian opposition group) Mubarak benefited from the global paranoia about Islamic extremism.
The 'New Egypt'
There are three scenarios for the political evolution of the 'new Egypt.' The least probable one is the occurrence of a military coup with a minor modification of the old order under Mubarak. It is important to bear in mind that as long as the military is involved in politics, there will always be a case for such a scenario. Nevertheless, domestic, regional, and global conditions, and the persistence of Egypt's January 25 protest movement, make a complete military takeover in Egypt something that would be very difficult to achieve. From its perspective, the Egyptian military would be understandably reluctant to assume responsibility for the country's ongoing economic failures.
The most likely scenario, at least for an extended transitional period, may be the establishment of a regime of military tutelage. Officers will hold political and military powers overseeing a civil technocratic government. Veto mechanisms would be established, where the civilian initiative is kept in check by institutions controlled by the military. This, of course, would restrict freedoms in daily life and generally hamper civilian authority. Such an arrangement kept Turkey anchored in the Atlantic alliance during the Cold War era but it proved unresponsive to the social, economic, and political realities of the 'new Turkey.' In the case of Egypt, military tutelage would effectively mean continuation of the 'Camp David order' domestically. Though a very possible scenario, the Egyptian military would have to convince Islamists and liberals that it was in the interests of the country.
The most desirable yet most difficult scenario is the creation of a democracy. Egypt would delegate authority to civilian actors and create a democratic constitution. Old elites would be withdrawn from politics. Even assuming success, it will take at least a few years before democracy takes hold and Egypt can reassert itself as a major regional player.
A democratic or semidemocratic Egypt may herald important shifts. Egypt will likely adopt a tougher posture toward Israel due to popular pressure that came to a head in September. Israeli forces in pursuit of terrorists entered the Sinai and killed Egyptian security personnel, prompting the interim Egyptian government to withdraw Egypt's ambassador from Israel. Later, protesters stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo, effectively forcing Israeli diplomats to flee the country. The incidents led Egyptians to criticize the peace treaty with Israel, which Prime Minister Essam Sharaf publicly described as "not sacred" and open to modification. A democratic Egypt that includes Muslim Brotherhood participation in the parliament and government may pursue the normalization of relations with Hamas and put an end to the isolation of Gaza.
In that vein, Egypt can play a positive role in integrating Islamist movements into the political structures in the region. Participation of Islamist parties in Egypt's democracy can provide a model of greater diversity within Islamist movements, whose previous exclusion from official politics encouraged reactionary and sometimes extreme behavior on the part of a minority of Islamists. If Islamism is normalized, nascent Islamist administrations in the region will not feel marginalized and can pursue politics democratically. That may encourage the emergence of more independent, democratic Arab countries.
A democratic Egypt may also influence the evolution of a new Arab nationalism—one that is more moderate and substantive than the more reactionary variety rooted in the pan-Arabism of the 1960s. Arab nationalism can become a more authentic expression once it is stripped of its authoritarian character. The involvement of Islamists will help ensure that any nationalistic revival does not turn into anti-Iranianism or anti-Turkism.
Iran's influence in the region will be affected by a new balance of power. Iran has posed a challenge to the status quo by championing the cause of the Palestinians. But being a Shiite-dominated country lacking Turkey's democratic credentials has limited its leverage. The emergence of a more democratic region with a Sunni majority will require Iran to revise its regional policies. In contrast with Turkey's nonsectarian approach, Iran may move toward exploiting sectarian differences. Egypt, hopefully, will resist attempts to forge sectarian alliances such as those supported by the Gulf countries. If the Muslim Brotherhood participates in government and controls its Salafist wing, the anti-Iranian bloc in the Arab world will likely lose strength. Such a change will leave Saudi Arabia more isolated. The so-called 'Sunni crescent plan,' supported by Gulf countries and the U.S., which aims to contain Iran through the forging of a sectarian bloc, may be rendered meaningless. In that case, struggles in the region would reflect competing national interests rather than potentially destructive sectarian bigotry.
Forging a Democratic Middle East
During his visit to Cairo in September, Egyptians gave the Turkish prime minister a hero's welcome. Indeed, some held up signs reading: "If Erdoğan had been our leader, we would have liberated our Jerusalem." While Erdoğan's Arab tour promoted Turkey's aspiration to contribute to the democratic transformation in the Middle East, it also reflected Ankara's vision of an integrated region opposed to national, religious, and sectarian divisions.
In Egypt, democracy is by far the most desirable scenario for Turkey. Indeed, Ankara must assume an active role and share its experience in evolving from the tutelary regime to a democratic one. Turkey can help Egypt, given its extensive experience in transition to civilian rule, managing civil–military relations and its long history with a multiparty political system, conducting free and fair elections, and constitution-making.
Concerning strategic interests, Turkey would like to see an Egypt that pays serious attention to people's demands, promotes the rule of law, recognizes the representation of all political actors, and solves its regional legitimacy problem. An economically powerful and democratic partner in the Middle East would fit Turkey's foreign policy priorities, which promote regional economic and political integration as well as freedom of movement. Turkey's own domestic political transformation led to the expansion of its presence in the region. A similar outcome for Egypt would be the most desirable for Turkey, despite the unavoidable areas of possible competition.
Turkey's regional standing will be directly affected by the developments in Egypt. An authoritarian Egypt will continue to be a source of harm for the region: normalization of Islamist movements would be delayed; the deadlock in the Palestinian issue would continue; and sectarian conflicts may emerge and threaten the regional peace and stability. However, if Egypt moves toward becoming a true democracy, it will undergo radical changes for the better in its domestic political life and foreign policy.
A democratic Egypt will limit Turkey's influence and popularity on the Arab street, but the two countries would have opportunities and shared responsibilities. They are the region's two largest key Sunni powers, comparable in size, historical experience, and strategic importance. They will have to lead the wider region toward freer and more democratic structures. And they will also have to shoulder the burden of managing the conflicts. A promising sign of potential cooperation was their work together in the Palestinian reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas in May. Relations between Turkey and Mubarak's regime had been strained after the Hamas leader's visit to Turkey amid Egypt's general discomfort with Turkey's proactive foreign policy in the Middle East.
The outcome of the current upheavals will help determine the future of Turkey–Egypt relations. As both Turkey and Egypt seek to resolve the crisis in their differing capacities, their cooperation and competition will be determined, to a large extent, by how Egypt emerges out of its own domestic political turmoil. Turkey's foreign policy activism, which has already deeply affected the region, and Egypt's new foreign policy orientation, influenced by and responsive to the demands of its domestic public opinion, will together play a crucial role in shaping the new regional political order.
If Egypt moves toward a truly civilian democracy, Turkey's gains in the region will become permanent and its role will increase. If Egypt comes out of the current turmoil as an economically and politically strong actor, competition will likely occur but this will empower both countries. If Egypt goes toward a tutelage system, Turkey as the only consolidated democracy would gain ground at Egypt's expense. The military in Egypt would be preoccupied trying to balance Islamist and liberal forces, which would diminish Egypt's potential to be a leader in the region.
A relatively weak Egypt would make Turkey's job more difficult, even if Ankara's prestige would remain high. Turkey may not find a partner to share its role in terms of regional policies and region-based approaches. The Middle East would waste time with short-term crisis management instead of constructing a truly new regional order. The urgent need for developing human resources, capacity building, and creating sustainable development projects would be delayed. Turkey constitutes an example of civilian power pushing back the influence of the military to consolidate its democratic institutions. As such, Ankara must oppose arguments that it is too early to establish full democracy in Egypt. Turkey's democratization was hampered by such arguments, which delayed civilianization of Turkish democracy.
When it comes to construction of a new regional order, as an economic and democratic power, Turkey has a lot to offer. Turkey is in many ways ahead of Egypt in what it can contribute to the shaping of the new Middle East. Turkey's challenge, however, is to institutionalize its regional gains and invest in sustaining its commitment to the region. The worst thing for Turkey would be to appear as a force that cannot deliver. Given the high expectations from Turkey among the Arab public and the intellectuals, Turkey will be held to a bigger test. In contrast, expectations from Egypt will be quite modest, and any step Egypt takes in the right direction will be considered positive.
This is where cooperation can come: Turkey and Egypt have the ability to fill the gaps left by one another. Egypt may not be able to confront Israeli policies directly, but Turkey can do that. Egypt also cannot promote democratic transitions around the Middle East as effectively as Turkey can. Turkey's intense pressure on the Al-Assad regime in Damascus, in the form of harboring opposition groups and military defectors, conducting border exercises, and threatening sanctions, is a clear example of this. Both Egypt and Turkey will be at odds with the Gulf powers who are neither en route to a democratic transition nor eager to take risks in the Palestinian issue. Those countries may become increasingly alienated from the region if Turkey–Egypt cooperation increases. This will be exacerbated if the U.S. (as the closest ally of the Gulf powers) becomes less inclined to support the authoritarian Gulf regimes.
Egypt has an advantage over Turkey in the regional leadership position as an Arab nation. But given the high diversity in the Middle East in terms of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity, Turkey has an advantage as it can speak to a variety of actors from different ethnicities (Iraqi Kurds) and sectarian groups (Iraqi Shiites, Lebanese Christians). Egypt's importance will be most apparent in the Arab–Israeli 'peace process,' which Turkey considers the single most important regional issue in the Middle East.
Because of its increasingly independent stance on foreign policy issues, Turkey has gained the trust of Arab populations and showed that Arab regimes were not only dysfunctional but also inept in constructing true solutions to regional problems. Turkey will need to build on this reputation while Egypt will have to earn it. Egypt may feel forced to distance itself from the U.S. policies in order to do that, while Turkey does not have to prove its independent approach by distancing itself from the West. Egypt must be careful not to fall into determining its policies based on anti-Islamist, anti-Shiite, anti-West, or anti-Israel frameworks. A proactive as opposed to reactionary Egypt, and a more democratic, independent Egypt, will prove to be a robust force.
The Arab revolutions have presented the Middle East with a historic opportunity for a more democratic and dignified future. Egypt's evolution into a stable democracy will be crucial for the structural transformation of the region. If the new Egypt seizes this opportunity without reverting to a pseudo-democracy for piecemeal strategic arrangements as it did in the past, the prospect of the emergence of a new Middle East may turn into reality. The greatest challenge for Turkey during this period is to help create the new language and terms of discourse. Turkey must not watch but manage this process, as it did during the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. If Turkey can remain involved and relevant in the medium term, then it may help the Arab momentum to create a truly new regional order.
Kadir Ustun is the research director of the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in Washington. He is the assistant editor of SETA's quarterly journal, Insight Turkey, and a contributor to the Al Jazeera English channel and insideIRAN.org.
Nuh Yilmaz is head of quality assurance for Al Jazeera Türk. He is the former Washington bureau chief for Turkish media organizations, including CNN Türk, ATV, 24, and STAR. He is a contributor to publications including the Washington Times, the National, Foreign Policy, and Open Democracy. He is a member of the board of the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research in Washington, and served as SETA's founding director from 2008 to 2011.
www.aucegypt.edu
refugees flee syria for turkey
Syria refugee crisis lands on Turkey's doorstep
Sat, 31/03/2012 - 15:1
Turkey is grappling with a refugee crisis stemming from the Damascus regime's military offensive against opponents as the country braces for a new influx of people fleeing the violence.
More than 17,000 Syrians have fled across the border into Turkey to escape President Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown on anti-government protests since the uprising erupted in mid-March last year.
The traumatised refugees are welcomed in camps described by local officials as "social life centres," which unlike those in Afghanistan and Somalia are aimed at boosting morale.
Menal, 33, who fled to Turkey in June 2011, went into shock after hearing that her house had been bombed and her relatives were killed by Syrian troops.
"I was taken to hospital every day and received intravenous drips," she said as she did embroidery work at a handicraft course in Yayladagi camp in Hatay province, only five kilometres (three miles) from Syria's northwestern border.
"I feel some sense of consolation here."
Turkish camps provide humanitarian aid including three meals a day, health services, clean water, and prayer rooms.
Gendarmes are deployed at the camps in charge of security, but refugees are allowed to go outside to do shopping and visit their relatives in nearby Turkish towns.
The camps also offer schooling for children with Arabic-speaking teachers giving lessons in maths, Turkish, computer science and Koranic studies. The sick and injured are treated at hospitals and women join handicraft courses.
While it says it is ready to extend any help for Syrians, Turkey also fears the number of arrivals could soar to the level of the half-million Iraqi Kurds who poured across the border to escape Saddam Hussein's repression during the 1991 Gulf War.
Turkish officials have contingency plans in the event of a larger-scale incursion as regime forces storm opposition towns near the Turkish border.
Currently, the government has set up nine locations including eight tented camps and a "container city" in Kilis, some 150 kilometres (95 miles) east of the Hatay camps, to deal with the influx.
Inhabitants of some camps in Hatay province have already been transferred to Kilis, where the prefabricated homes will initially receive 10,000 people.
East of Kiflis in Sanliurfa province, near the halfway point of Turkey's 910-kilometre (560-mile) border with Syria, another massive camp is under construction that can house up to 20,000 people.
While the mass influx is bound to have lasting consequences, Turkey is clear it does not want to see the Syrians as permanent residents and refuses to call them refugees.
"We call them Syrians under temporary protection, not refugees," Suphi Atan, head of the foreign ministry's task force in Hatay province, told AFP.
"They are deprived of the right to apply for refugee status. We expect them to voluntarily return to their country once the situation is secure," he said. "But we cannot compel any Syrians to go back."
Initially, the government had described them as "guests" to emphasise the temporary nature of their asylum in Turkey but later dropped the term because "there is no guest status in international law," Atan said.
Some of the Syrians have already applied for asylum in Turkey, Metin Corabatir, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Turkey Office, confirmed.
But his office, in close coordination with Ankara, had to turn down the asylum requests because the temporary protection status is applicable in international law, he told AFP.
The concept developed in the 1990s when European Union countries maintained an open-door policy for thousands of refugees who poured in from Bosnia during the 1992-95 war during the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's year-long crackdown on anti-regime protestors has left more than 9,000 people dead according to the United Nations
More than 17,000 Syrians have fled across the border into Turkey to escape President Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown on anti-government protests since the uprising erupted in mid-March last year.
The traumatised refugees are welcomed in camps described by local officials as "social life centres," which unlike those in Afghanistan and Somalia are aimed at boosting morale.
Menal, 33, who fled to Turkey in June 2011, went into shock after hearing that her house had been bombed and her relatives were killed by Syrian troops.
"I was taken to hospital every day and received intravenous drips," she said as she did embroidery work at a handicraft course in Yayladagi camp in Hatay province, only five kilometres (three miles) from Syria's northwestern border.
"I feel some sense of consolation here."
Turkish camps provide humanitarian aid including three meals a day, health services, clean water, and prayer rooms.
Gendarmes are deployed at the camps in charge of security, but refugees are allowed to go outside to do shopping and visit their relatives in nearby Turkish towns.
The camps also offer schooling for children with Arabic-speaking teachers giving lessons in maths, Turkish, computer science and Koranic studies. The sick and injured are treated at hospitals and women join handicraft courses.
While it says it is ready to extend any help for Syrians, Turkey also fears the number of arrivals could soar to the level of the half-million Iraqi Kurds who poured across the border to escape Saddam Hussein's repression during the 1991 Gulf War.
Turkish officials have contingency plans in the event of a larger-scale incursion as regime forces storm opposition towns near the Turkish border.
Currently, the government has set up nine locations including eight tented camps and a "container city" in Kilis, some 150 kilometres (95 miles) east of the Hatay camps, to deal with the influx.
Inhabitants of some camps in Hatay province have already been transferred to Kilis, where the prefabricated homes will initially receive 10,000 people.
East of Kiflis in Sanliurfa province, near the halfway point of Turkey's 910-kilometre (560-mile) border with Syria, another massive camp is under construction that can house up to 20,000 people.
While the mass influx is bound to have lasting consequences, Turkey is clear it does not want to see the Syrians as permanent residents and refuses to call them refugees.
"We call them Syrians under temporary protection, not refugees," Suphi Atan, head of the foreign ministry's task force in Hatay province, told AFP.
"They are deprived of the right to apply for refugee status. We expect them to voluntarily return to their country once the situation is secure," he said. "But we cannot compel any Syrians to go back."
Initially, the government had described them as "guests" to emphasise the temporary nature of their asylum in Turkey but later dropped the term because "there is no guest status in international law," Atan said.
Some of the Syrians have already applied for asylum in Turkey, Metin Corabatir, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Turkey Office, confirmed.
But his office, in close coordination with Ankara, had to turn down the asylum requests because the temporary protection status is applicable in international law, he told AFP.
The concept developed in the 1990s when European Union countries maintained an open-door policy for thousands of refugees who poured in from Bosnia during the 1992-95 war during the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's year-long crackdown on anti-regime protestors has left more than 9,000 people dead according to the United Nations
Turkish dam
Turkey’s unstoppable dam
After failing to court Chinese investors, Turkey is set to self-finance a controversial billion-dollar dam project, reports Crystal Luxmore.
The Ilisu dam – which activists say will displace at least 11,000 villagers, damage the environment and flood a 10,000-year-old village – is back on Turkey’s books.
Near the end of December, Veysel Eroglu, Minister for Environment and Forestry, announced negotiations with three Turkish banks to finance the deal, saying he expected a contract to be signed by February. The move quashes speculation that Chinese funders could back the project.
Letters, rock concerts, protests at European embassies in Ankara, and at government agencies abroad, are mainstays of an unrelenting campaign against the Ilisu dam by activist groups and European non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who say the human rights, environmental and heritage violations the project brings are too great to justify the 3.833 billion kWh of power that the second-largest dam in the country would generate annually. Last July, the German, Swiss and Austrian creditors behind the dam were forced to agree. They backed out of the project, saying Turkey failed to meet 80 per cent of the roughly 150 contract obligations needed to bring the project up to World Bank standards.
In 2001, local opposition groups and non-governmental organizations in Europe helped force a British-backed consortium, led by Balfour Beatty, to renege on the deal.
Over the last two years, construction in Ilisu village has been stop-and-go as the financial consortium ordered freezes because contract obligations weren’t being met. For the villagers, it’s meant living with an unknown future, and with Big Brother.
‘It’s very stressful because they’re in living in a security zone,’ says Heike Drillisch from CounterCurrent, a German NGO. ‘There’s a checkpoint at the closest town to Ilisu, about 20 kilometres away, to control cars going into Ilisu.’ Fifteen security posts, watched over by soldiers with machine guns, dot the surrounding hills.
Ilisu villagers are the first people slated for relocation. The idea is to move villagers to new town sites built nearby. Activists say the new homes will be more expensive than the payouts the villagers receive and will force many into nearby cities like Batman and Diyarbakir – places already overflowing with poor Kurds forced out of their villages during the crackdown on the Kurdish independence movement in the 1990s.
About 100 kilometres upstream from Ilisu sits the protester’s prize gem, and the consortium’s biggest nightmare – Hasankeyf. The 10,000-year-old village rises up at a bend in the wide, shallow waters of the Tigris, its golden, limestone cliffs dotted with thousands of man-made caves. Home to 300 medieval monuments, experts say it could be one of the oldest continuous settlements in the world.
But in a country so rich in archeology that some homeowners use ancient, underground caves as cold cellars, the drive for rapid industrialization behind power projects usually trumps history. Currently 148 dams are under construction and plans for 1,400 more are on the books. They will triple the nation’s hydroelectric capacity.
In the past, Turkey has steamrolled over opposition to its major dam projects. But the forcible relocation of Kurdish citizens is a sensitive issue abroad and Hasankeyf has so far proven a worthy opponent.
Two summers ago, I met Halil Güzel. He was rocking the youngest of his 11 children in a hammock strung up underneath one of Hasankeyf’s handful of riverside cafes. His pleated khakis were rolled up, ready to wade into the rocky riverbed should a customer request a tea on the wooden platforms hanging over the Tigris. Like many of the villagers along the river, he works construction jobs in Istanbul or Ankara in the winter and spends summers here. Despite the threat of being labelled a terrorist by the Government, Güzel says he’ll continue to speak out against the dam. He has a responsibility to protect 10,000 years of history. ‘Think of the next generation,’ he says. ‘If Hasankeyf goes under water they’ll say, “What did our fathers and brothers do?”’
Near the end of December, Veysel Eroglu, Minister for Environment and Forestry, announced negotiations with three Turkish banks to finance the deal, saying he expected a contract to be signed by February. The move quashes speculation that Chinese funders could back the project.
Letters, rock concerts, protests at European embassies in Ankara, and at government agencies abroad, are mainstays of an unrelenting campaign against the Ilisu dam by activist groups and European NGOs
The homegrown solution is a last ditch attempt to keep the US$1.7 billion Ilisu dam project alive after two European consortiums backed out of the giant power project, which Turkey has been trying to move ahead since it was green-lighted in 1982. Both consortiums spent years and hundreds of thousands of dollars on the dam, which is set to flood hundreds of tiny villages along a stretch of the Tigris River that flows through the Kurdish-dominated southeast. But relentless pressure from local Turks and European activists forced funders to walk away. Letters, rock concerts, protests at European embassies in Ankara, and at government agencies abroad, are mainstays of an unrelenting campaign against the Ilisu dam by activist groups and European non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who say the human rights, environmental and heritage violations the project brings are too great to justify the 3.833 billion kWh of power that the second-largest dam in the country would generate annually. Last July, the German, Swiss and Austrian creditors behind the dam were forced to agree. They backed out of the project, saying Turkey failed to meet 80 per cent of the roughly 150 contract obligations needed to bring the project up to World Bank standards.
Playing games
‘We had the impression that the Turkish Government was playing a game with us a little bit,’ said Erich Stather, state secretary of Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation. He said Turkish officials were vague about meeting contract obligations and would not allow his ministry to visit villages slated for flooding without a military escort.In 2001, local opposition groups and non-governmental organizations in Europe helped force a British-backed consortium, led by Balfour Beatty, to renege on the deal.
Over the last two years, construction in Ilisu village has been stop-and-go as the financial consortium ordered freezes because contract obligations weren’t being met
But European construction giants remain in the project. Austrian-based Andritz will build the turbines, and German company, Zueblin will build the massive tunnel. Activists could turn the heat up on these companies next – without their know-how, Turkey can’t build the dam.Over the last two years, construction in Ilisu village has been stop-and-go as the financial consortium ordered freezes because contract obligations weren’t being met. For the villagers, it’s meant living with an unknown future, and with Big Brother.
The Oymapinar Dam, currently the fifth largest in Turkey, would be dwarfed by the Ilisu Dam, should the project be completed. Photo by: Nick Irvine-Fortescue under a CC Licence
Ilisu villagers are the first people slated for relocation. The idea is to move villagers to new town sites built nearby. Activists say the new homes will be more expensive than the payouts the villagers receive and will force many into nearby cities like Batman and Diyarbakir – places already overflowing with poor Kurds forced out of their villages during the crackdown on the Kurdish independence movement in the 1990s.
In limbo
Ilisu residents are in limbo, says Heike. ‘Their land has been expropriated, but they have not been relocated yet. The new village that’s being built is not finished and it’s unclear if construction work is actually happening.’About 100 kilometres upstream from Ilisu sits the protester’s prize gem, and the consortium’s biggest nightmare – Hasankeyf. The 10,000-year-old village rises up at a bend in the wide, shallow waters of the Tigris, its golden, limestone cliffs dotted with thousands of man-made caves. Home to 300 medieval monuments, experts say it could be one of the oldest continuous settlements in the world.
About 100 kilometres upstream from Ilisu sits the protester’s prize gem, and the consortium’s biggest nightmare – Hasankeyf. Home to 300 medieval monuments, experts say it could be one of the oldest continuous settlements in the world
Erkut Erturk, campaign coordinator for Doga Dernegi, says the Government plans to move just nine of the monuments, including a crumbling bridge, a minaret and some ancient doors, and put them in a new park for tourists. ‘Forget about removal – they need protection immediately,’ he says.But in a country so rich in archeology that some homeowners use ancient, underground caves as cold cellars, the drive for rapid industrialization behind power projects usually trumps history. Currently 148 dams are under construction and plans for 1,400 more are on the books. They will triple the nation’s hydroelectric capacity.
In the past, Turkey has steamrolled over opposition to its major dam projects. But the forcible relocation of Kurdish citizens is a sensitive issue abroad and Hasankeyf has so far proven a worthy opponent.
Two summers ago, I met Halil Güzel. He was rocking the youngest of his 11 children in a hammock strung up underneath one of Hasankeyf’s handful of riverside cafes. His pleated khakis were rolled up, ready to wade into the rocky riverbed should a customer request a tea on the wooden platforms hanging over the Tigris. Like many of the villagers along the river, he works construction jobs in Istanbul or Ankara in the winter and spends summers here. Despite the threat of being labelled a terrorist by the Government, Güzel says he’ll continue to speak out against the dam. He has a responsibility to protect 10,000 years of history. ‘Think of the next generation,’ he says. ‘If Hasankeyf goes under water they’ll say, “What did our fathers and brothers do?”’
Water issues in the region
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martes, 12 de junio de 2012
human rights respect by current turkish govt
Restrictions on human rights poison positive Turkish climate | |
| Turkey used to be named among countries that grossly violated basic human rights, especially during the military coup era when the situation in the country began to deteriorate. The 1982 Constitution, authored by the military after the 1980 bloody coup, ended all sorts of freedoms, including the freedom of speech. Since then more than one-third of the document has been amended to reinstate basic freedoms usurped by the military-backed regime. The Constitution is currently being rewritten by a parliamentary commission with the aim of introducing a democratic charter. | |
| Turkey has undergone a transformation towards installing the rule of law since the country became a candidate member country to the European Union at a Helsinki summit of the bloc in 1999. This was followed by accession partnership talks in 2005 between Turkey and the EU that intended to pave the way for Turkey’s full membership to the bloc. Particularly between 1999 and 2005, Turkey took incredible steps to lift restrictions to many freedoms while reducing the military’s overwhelming power in politics. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) played a significant role in the implementation of both civilian and military reforms since it came to power in November 2002. However, Turkey, under the reformist AK Party, and in the ruling party’s third term in power, has, paradoxically, slowed down democratic reforms in recent years in parallel with the stalled accession talks between Turkey and the EU. Ankara has now come under increased criticism from both inside and outside mainly from the US and the EU over its worsening climate of freedom of expression. There have been many incidents taking place that have justified the criticisms leveled against Turkey for its violation of the right to free speech as well as human rights in general. In the latest pressure tactics exerted upon opposing views, two university students were sentenced to eight years and five months in prison by an İstanbul court for membership in a terrorist organization, while a third student was sentenced to two years and two months in jail for spreading terrorist propaganda. It is hard to understand such reasons cited by the court in its verdict against the three university students since the students faced court hearings for carrying a banner that read, “We want free education, we will get it.” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has increasingly become intolerant of criticism, which has resulted in some serious questions being raised over whether Turkey is moving towards a repressive regime. Turkey’s greatest democratic deficit is a lack of an opposition that would have otherwise prevented the increasing violation of free speech in Turkey. The government’s intolerance to criticism has been poisoning a positive climate achieved in the early years of its rule. For example, the Turkish police, which have been receiving training in human rights issues for a long time, have also started to breach the rules set forth, which was seen during street demonstrations. The Turkish police force recently came under severe criticism over its excessive use of force as well as in its uncontrollable usage of tear gas and pepper spray to disperse demonstrators. A Turkish citizen died recently when police pepper sprayed him despite the fact that he allegedly asked the police not to use the spray due to his asthma. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) convicted Turkey on April 10 in the case of Ali Güneş, a Turkish high school teacher who was sprayed with both pepper spray and tear gas during a demonstration. In his case, the ECtHR ruled, unanimously, that there was a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Ali Güneş took part in a demonstration against the 2004 NATO summit in İstanbul and he complained to the ECtHR over his ill-treatment by police and that tear gas was sprayed on his face. The court concluded that there was no justification for the usage of pepper spray and tear gas against Ali Güneş, and that the police were negligent for not conducting an investigation into his complaints. At a time when many nations have been going through serious economic crises, the Turkish economy is moving in the right direction despite some risks. The AK Party should not risk the achievements that Turkey has made so far, in both the economic and democratic fields under its leadership, by silencing the opposition. | |
north korea humanitarian aid
UN seeks $198 million for humanitarian needs in DPR Korea in 2012
Farmers harvest their crops in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Photo: FAO/Belay Derza Gaga
Amid funding concerns for ongoing activities, the United Nations seeks $198 million to address critical humanitarian needs in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2012. “Sixteen million people continue to suffer from chronic food insecurity, high malnutrition rates, and deep-rooted economic problems,” the UN Resident Coordinator in the DPRK, Jerome Sauvage, said in a news release. “Inadequate medical supplies and equipment make the health care system unable to meet basic needs, while the water and heating systems need to be rehabilitated.”
The Overview Funding Document (OFD), which outlines the funding needs for the UN’s humanitarian activities in DPRK, was presented to the international donor community in Beijing today, and in Pyongyang on 7 June. It also describes the current situation and the efforts being made to improve it in food and nutritional assistance, agricultural support and interventions in the water, sanitation, hygiene and health sectors.
According to the Resident Coordinators’ office, around two million people in the country’s most food insecure areas are currently receiving nutritious food assistance.
About 10,300 children will be treated for severe acute malnutrition and 57,000 for moderate acute malnutrition. The cereal deficit for the 2011/12 marketing year was estimated at 739,000 metric tons, leading to an uncovered cereal deficit of 414,000 metric tons.
The UN’s humanitarian focus in DPRK is on mitigating the protracted crisis through a sustained humanitarian response that addresses immediate and intermediate needs, while also addressing some of the root causes of the vulnerabilities in order to build resilience and sustainable livelihoods.
“External assistance is still needed and continues to play a vital role in safeguarding and promoting the well-being of millions whose food security, nutritional status and general health would otherwise be seriously compromised,” said Mr. Sauvage.
In 2011, the UN called for $218 million to address humanitarian needs in DPRK – it received some $85 million from donors, led by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Due to the lack of funds, humanitarian agencies have been unable to effectively address humanitarian needs.
“The UN in DPRK remains seriously underfunded. Provision of assistance must be based on the humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and not be contingent on political developments,” said Mr. Sauvage. “Separating humanitarian needs from political issues is a prerequisite for a sustainable improvement in the condition of people.”
Financed by voluntary contributions from Member States, non-governmental organizations, local governments, the private sector and individual donors, the CERF is a humanitarian fund established by the United Nations to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts, helping agencies to pre-position funding for humanitarian action.
The Overview Funding Document (OFD), which outlines the funding needs for the UN’s humanitarian activities in DPRK, was presented to the international donor community in Beijing today, and in Pyongyang on 7 June. It also describes the current situation and the efforts being made to improve it in food and nutritional assistance, agricultural support and interventions in the water, sanitation, hygiene and health sectors.
According to the Resident Coordinators’ office, around two million people in the country’s most food insecure areas are currently receiving nutritious food assistance.
About 10,300 children will be treated for severe acute malnutrition and 57,000 for moderate acute malnutrition. The cereal deficit for the 2011/12 marketing year was estimated at 739,000 metric tons, leading to an uncovered cereal deficit of 414,000 metric tons.
The UN’s humanitarian focus in DPRK is on mitigating the protracted crisis through a sustained humanitarian response that addresses immediate and intermediate needs, while also addressing some of the root causes of the vulnerabilities in order to build resilience and sustainable livelihoods.
“External assistance is still needed and continues to play a vital role in safeguarding and promoting the well-being of millions whose food security, nutritional status and general health would otherwise be seriously compromised,” said Mr. Sauvage.
In 2011, the UN called for $218 million to address humanitarian needs in DPRK – it received some $85 million from donors, led by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Due to the lack of funds, humanitarian agencies have been unable to effectively address humanitarian needs.
“The UN in DPRK remains seriously underfunded. Provision of assistance must be based on the humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and not be contingent on political developments,” said Mr. Sauvage. “Separating humanitarian needs from political issues is a prerequisite for a sustainable improvement in the condition of people.”
Financed by voluntary contributions from Member States, non-governmental organizations, local governments, the private sector and individual donors, the CERF is a humanitarian fund established by the United Nations to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts, helping agencies to pre-position funding for humanitarian action.
north korea satellite launch
Turkey urges North Korea to avoid steps undermining six-party talks
13 April 2012 / TODAYSZAMAN.COM,
Turkey deplored North Korea's rocket launch on Friday, saying it could complicate efforts to revive six-party talks over the nuclear program of the reclusive Asian nation.
North Korea's attempt to launch a satellite ended in failure on Friday when the rocket disintegrated over the Yellow Sea. Western nations have said the launch was a cover for the testing of a long-range missile, and worries remain about North Korea's nuclear program amid reports that it may be planning another atomic test soon.
The six-party talks with Pyongyang last held three years ago. The Security Council imposed sanctions against North Korea after its first nuclear test in 2006 and stepped up sanctions after its second test in 2009.
North Korea had held up the launch as a scientific achievement and even a gift for its late founder, Kim Il Sung, two days before the 100th anniversary of his birth. It pressed ahead even as world leaders vowed to take action in the UN Security Council against what they called a flagrant violation of international resolutions prohibiting North Korea from developing its nuclear and missile programs.
The UN's most powerful body said in a brief press statement after a closed meeting on Friday that members agreed to continue consultations "on an appropriate response."
Turkey said in a statement on Friday that it is closely following North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile activities and that Turkey is actively supporting international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their launchers.
North Korea, which three years ago pulled out of six-party disarmament talks on its nuclear program, agreed in February to stop nuclear tests, uranium enrichment and long-range missile launches in return for food aid, opening the way to a possible resumption of the negotiations. Turkey said it welcomed North Korea’s decision to suspend uranium enrichment as a way to revive six-party talks.
Turkey said it is concerned over the latest rocket launch by North Korea and considers it as a step that cast shadow over the positive actions the Asian nation has taken this year.
The six-party talks with Pyongyang last held three years ago. The Security Council imposed sanctions against North Korea after its first nuclear test in 2006 and stepped up sanctions after its second test in 2009.
North Korea had held up the launch as a scientific achievement and even a gift for its late founder, Kim Il Sung, two days before the 100th anniversary of his birth. It pressed ahead even as world leaders vowed to take action in the UN Security Council against what they called a flagrant violation of international resolutions prohibiting North Korea from developing its nuclear and missile programs.
The UN's most powerful body said in a brief press statement after a closed meeting on Friday that members agreed to continue consultations "on an appropriate response."
Turkey said in a statement on Friday that it is closely following North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile activities and that Turkey is actively supporting international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their launchers.
North Korea, which three years ago pulled out of six-party disarmament talks on its nuclear program, agreed in February to stop nuclear tests, uranium enrichment and long-range missile launches in return for food aid, opening the way to a possible resumption of the negotiations. Turkey said it welcomed North Korea’s decision to suspend uranium enrichment as a way to revive six-party talks.
Turkey said it is concerned over the latest rocket launch by North Korea and considers it as a step that cast shadow over the positive actions the Asian nation has taken this year.
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